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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Carlos Enrique Pagan-Lopez appeals from his convictions for possession of
methamphetamine, and for introducing and/or attempting to introduce major contraband
into a jail facility. Pagan-Lopez claims the district court erred by 1) denying his motion
to suppress; 2) rejecting his guilty plea; 3) excluding Pagan-Lopez’s own opinion about
his mental health; and 4) ordering restitution for the costs of prosecution. Pagan-Lopez
also claims, for the first time on appeal, that his convictions violated his double jeopardy
rights under the Idaho Constitution.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Officers responded to an early-morning residential burglary alarm. (Prelim. Hr’g
Tr., p.12, Ls.17-19. 1) The location of the alarm was a dead-end street that Pagan-Lopez
was driving away from, where he was the only vehicle on the street. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr.,
p.12, Ls.17 – p.13, L.10; p.17, Ls.3-16.)

Officers stopped Pagan-Lopez’s vehicle,

discovered he had a felony arrest warrant, and transported him to jail. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr.,
p.13, L.11 – p.14, L.23.) During a jail search an officer also discovered that Pagan-Lopez
had some methamphetamine hidden in his sock. (Tr. vol. I, p.160, L.23 – p.162, L.12;
p.191, Ls.6-15.)

The state charged Pagan-Lopez with possession of a controlled
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Upon the parties’ stipulation, the preliminary hearing transcript was admitted into the
evidentiary record for the motion to suppress hearing. (Tr. vol. I, p.1, L.21 – p.2, L.3.)
This brief will adopt the convention of the Appellant’s brief and denote the volume of
transcripts containing the motion to suppress hearing, the entry of plea hearing, and trial
as “Tr. vol. I.” The volume containing the sentencing transcripts will be denoted as “Tr.
vol. II.”
1

substance, and with introducing and/or attempting to introduce major contraband into a
correctional facility. (R., pp.31-32.)
Pagan-Lopez filed a motion to suppress, arguing the officers did not have
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, and that the search was too attenuated from the
stop to be upheld in light of the arrest warrants. (R., pp.50-53.) The district court found
there was probable cause to support the stop and denied the motion. (Tr. vol. I, p.17,
L.17 – p.18, L.23.)
Prior to trial, Pagan-Lopez and the parties reached a plea agreement. (Tr. vol. I,
p.24, L.9 – p.30, L.4.) But during the entry of plea hearing, the district court would not
accept Pagan-Lopez’s attempt to plead guilty. (Tr. vol. I, p.34, L.9, p.47, L.1.) During
his colloquy Pagan-Lopez maintained that he had put the methamphetamine in his sock to
protect children and simply forgot about it. (Tr. vol. I, p.34, L.9 – p.35, L.9; p.38, L.23 –
p.39, L.6.) The district court was unwilling to accept this plea, and the state was not
willing to offer the same plea deal via an Alford 2 plea. (Tr. vol. I, p.35, L.10 – p.41,
L.16.) The case thus proceeded to trial.
Pagan-Lopez testified at trial. (Tr. vol. I, pp.204-18.) His attorney sought to ask
Pagan-Lopez “about his memory problems and his epilepsy,” which would have
presumably bolstered his forgotten-methamphetamine-in-the-sock defense. (Tr. vol. I,
p.198, L.20 – p.201, L.20; p.267, Ls.4-14.) The state objected, arguing it had not been
properly notified per Idaho Code Section 18-207(4). (Tr. vol. I, p.198, L.24 – p.199,
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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)
2

L.14.)

The district court granted the objection and excluded “the defendant’s own

opinion of his medical condition” from evidence. (Tr. vol. I, p.199, L.23 – p.201, L.20.)
Pagan-Lopez was found guilty of both counts. (Tr. vol. I, p.277, Ls.6-20.) The
district court sentenced Pagan-Lopez to five years imprisonment with one year fixed on
the possession charge, and to two-and-a-half concurrent years with no fixed term on the
introduction of major contraband charge, retaining jurisdiction. (R., pp.109-12.) The
state sought $996.27 in restitution for costs of prosecution, which Pagan-Lopez objected
to, but which the district court ultimately ordered. (Tr. vol. II, p.4, L.18 – p.5, L.11; R.,
pp.114-17.)
Pagan-Lopez timely appeals. (R., pp.118-20.)
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ISSUES
Pagan-Lopez states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s motion to
suppress?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by rejecting Mr. PaganLopez’s guilty plea?

III.

Did Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s convictions and punishments for
possession of a controlled substance and introduction of
contraband into the jail violate his right to be free from double
jeopardy?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion at trial by excluding Mr.
Pagan-Lopez’s layperson testimony of his mental health?

V.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. PaganLopez to pay restitution for the State’s prosecution costs?

(Appellant’s brief, p.9)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.

Has Pagan-Lopez failed to show the district court erred by rejecting his guilty
plea?

II.

Has Pagan-Lopez failed to show the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress evidence?

III.

Has Pagan-Lopez failed to show his double jeopardy rights under the Idaho
Constitution were violated?

IV.

Was the exclusion of Pagan-Lopez’s testimony about his mental health harmless
error?

V.

Has Pagan-Lopez failed to show the district court abused its discretion by ordering
restitution?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Pagan-Lopez Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Rejecting His Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
Pagan-Lopez argues the district court abused its discretion when it rejected his

guilty plea prior to trial. (Appellant’s brief, pp.18-28.) He contends that the district court
erred because, while he “identified a potential defense of necessity,” he “clearly intended
to waive it.” (Appellant’s brief, p.25.) Pagan-Lopez also argues that the district court
erred by requiring a factual basis and/or inquiring about or ruling out potential defenses,
because “Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s valid guilty plea was all that was required for the district
court to accept it.” (Appellant’s brief, p.26.)
Pagan-Lopez fails to show an abuse of discretion. District courts have broad
discretion to reject a plea and may do so based on all the relevant circumstances before
them. Because Pagan-Lopez did not provide a factual basis that he unlawfully possessed
methamphetamine the district court did not abuse its discretion by not accepting his plea.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho’s appellate court examine three factors when reviewing a claimed abuse of

discretion: “(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the
trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho
622, 627, 226 P.3d 1269, 1274 (2010).

5

C.

The District Court Was Well Within Its Discretion To Reject Pagan-Lopez’s Plea,
Given Its Doubts That There Was A Factual Basis For The Plea
“A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to

have his guilty plea accepted” by a trial court. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38,
n.11 (1970); see also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962). While states may
“confer such a right” Idaho has not done so; in Idaho “[a] trial judge’s decision whether to
accept guilty pleas” is a discretionary one, and courts are “are given wide discretion in
determining whether a strong factual basis exists” for a plea of guilty. Alford, 400 U.S. at
38, n.11; Schoger, 148 Idaho at 627, 226 P.3d at 1274; State v. Jones, 129 Idaho 471,
474, 926 P.2d 1318, 1321 (Ct. App. 1996). Consequently, trial courts are well within
their discretion to reject a guilty plea if the court harbors doubts about the factual basis
for the plea.
That was exactly what occurred in Schoger, where, “[t]hroughout the plea
colloquy, the trial court displayed persistent uncertainty as to whether a factual basis
existed for Schoger’s plea.” Id. at 628, 226 P.3d at 1275. The court was uncertain during
the colloquy because “after each question by the court pertaining to the methamphetamine
found in the bedroom, Schoger looked to her attorney for answers.” Id. The court
“expressly told Schoger that it was asking her questions in order to establish a factual
basis for a plea,” and noted “it always makes me nervous when I’m talking to somebody
who is looking to their attorney to see apparently what sort of answers they ought to
give.” Id. Moreover, the trial court noted that “I couldn’t help but notice some reticence
on Ms. Schoger’s part when it came to the question of possession.” Id. Not only that,
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Ms. Schoger’s “own lawyer displayed doubt as to whether there was a strong factual basis
for the charge,” as follows:
[W]ith regard to the methamphetamine that was in the house, primarily
Mr. Davis was the person that was handling the methamphetamine. Ms.
Schoger indicates that he would basically keep it hidden from Ms.
Schoger. However, that she did reside in the residence, and we strongly
believe that the state is going to be able to prove constructive possession if
this matter does proceed to trial.
Id. This statement from Schoger’s attorney understandably “did little to alleviate the
district court’s tentativeness as to the factual basis for the charge.” Id.
The trial court therefore “refused to accept either [Schoger’s] guilty plea or an
Alford plea.” Id. at 624, 226 P.3d at 1271. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, finding
“the conversation at the plea colloquy demonstrates that the district court held reasoned
reservations about whether a factual basis existed for Schoger’s guilty plea.” Id. at 628,
226 P.3d at 1275.

Furthermore, the trial court “recognized that it must make the

discretionary determination as to whether a factual basis existed, and asked questions
pertinent to obtaining that factual basis.” Id. (emphasis added). The Schoger Court
affirmed because “the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion,”
and “[b]etween Schoger’s obvious uncertainty as to the answers to the court’s questions
and her lawyer’s declaration that a factual basis may not exist for the plea, we cannot say
that the district court abused its discretion” in rejecting the guilty plea. Id. at 629, 226
P.3d at 1276.
Schoger controls here. Like Schoger, Pagan-Lopez did not provide a factual basis
for his guilty plea. When the trial court asked Pagan-Lopez whether he intended to
possess the methamphetamine, Pagan-Lopez testified that:
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A.

My intention was to throw it away, but I didn’t find the right place
to throw it away.

Q.

So do you think that—how long did you possess it?

A.
Your Honor, I put it on my socks, and I forgot about it. I don’t
remember how long—several hours.
Q.

Do you believe you had any lawful reason to have it?

A.
I did no time, no reason to have it, other than I found it, and there
was a lot of kids around the area that I found it, and I just grab it to throw
it away later in the right place, and I forgot about it.
(Tr. vol. I, p.34, L.23 – p.35, L.9.) Based on Pagan-Lopez’s statements the district court
would not accept his plea:
I don’t believe that that’s a provident plea. He’s asserting a defense that he
had a lawful reason to possess it, to dispose of it. Given those explanations
I don’t think that he’s admitted to every element of the offense, so I don’t
think it’s a provident plea.
(Tr. vol. I, p.10, Ls.10-15.) The district court went on to explain that:
My concern is that his statements give rise to a necessity defense, which is
defined in Idaho Code Standard Instruction 512, where a defendant cannot
be guilty of a named crime if the defendant acted because of necessity and
what he’s saying is he picked it up because he knew it was
methamphetamine there were children around and he was going to dispose
of it to protect those children.
Conduct which violates the law is justified by necessity if there is a
specific threat of immediate harm to the defendant or another person. The
defendant did not bring about the circumstances which created the threat
of the immediate harm. He’s not saying it was his methamphetamine. He
said, you know, he came upon it and was picking it up to protect small
children, that the defendant could not have prevented the threatened harm
by a less offensive alternative. I think there is an issue, but, again, that
would be an issue for the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the harm caused by violating the law was less than the threatened
harm.
So my concern is that, given his statements, there may be a defense to this
particular offense, and he has not admitted that he planned to continue to
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possess it, and I do understand that possession in the interim could be a
lawful violation, but, as stated, I’m not going to twist his arm to enter a
guilty plea if he thinks that he was protecting small children by his
behavior, and so I’m not willing to accept a plea on the eve of trial, given
his statements to the court under oath.
(Tr. vol. I, p.36, L.17 – p.37, L.22.)
This was not an abuse of discretion. Like the trial court in Schoger, the district
court here sought to “make the discretionary determination as to whether a factual basis
existed” for a guilty plea, before accepting such a plea. See 148 Idaho at 628, 226 P.3d at
1275. And like the court in Schoger, the trial court here very reasonably doubted the
existence of such a basis. Based on Pagan-Lopez’s repeated assertions that he had “no
reason” to possess the methamphetamine other than to protect children by throwing it
away, the district court was concerned about Pagan-Lopez’s defense of necessity, and
how Pagan-Lopez had not provided a basis that he unlawfully possessed the drugs. (Tr.
vol. I, p.36, L.17 – p.37, L.22.) The court was therefore, correctly, unwilling to “twist his
arm to enter a guilty plea.” (Tr. vol. I, p.37, L.18.) Per Schoger, refusing to accept a
guilty plea without a sufficient factual basis was not an abuse of discretion.
On appeal, Pagan-Lopez fails to show an abuse of discretion. He contends that
the district court erred because the guilty plea itself would have waived his necessity
defense (Appellant’s brief, pp.19-26), and that the district court applied the incorrect legal
standard when it inquired into the existence of a factual basis for the plea (Appellant’s
brief, pp.26-27).
Both of these arguments miss the mark. As for the waiver of the necessity
defense, Pagan-Lopez himself never stated that he wished to waive a potential defense
that he had by pleading guilty. Rather, he continued to assert in his colloquy that the
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defense existed. (Compare Tr. vol. I, p.34, L. 10 – p.35, L.9; p.38, L.23 – p.39, L.6 with
Tr. vol. I, p.46, Ls.1-16 (where Pagan-Lopez’s counsel mentions the possibility of a
defense, but where Pagan-Lopez himself does not state that he wished to waive any
possible defense)). Insofar as Pagan-Lopez continued to maintain the existence of a
defense, the district court understandably doubted that a factual basis for a crucial element
of the crime existed.
And Pagan-Lopez has not shown that, as he claims, the district court erred by not
accepting his guilty plea “because a valid guilty plea does not require a factual basis.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.26-27.) To the contrary, the Schoger Court affirmed that district
courts do not abuse their discretion by determining whether there is a factual basis before
accepting a guilty plea. Schoger, 148 Idaho at 629, 226 P.3d at 1276.
Of course, the factual-basis determination can be made from information that is
already in the record, and that is outside of the plea. That was exactly the case in State v.
Hawkins, 117 Idaho 285, 787 P.2d 271 (1990), where the district court accepted the
defendant’s plea mid-trial, after hearing three weeks’ of the state’s evidence against him,
and the defendant, also “well aware of the evidence against him” stated “that he was
pleading guilty because he was tired and the state had proved its case.” 117 Idaho at 28590, 787 P.2d at 271-76. Similarly, in State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 661 P.2d 328
(1983), “the defendant’s pleas of guilty to the first degree burglary charges constitute a
tacit admission of the facts alleged in the informations [sic],” and where “prior to the
court’s acceptance of the guilty pleas, the defendant expressly admitted that he was guilty
of the charges.” 104 Idaho at 546, 661 P.2d at 331. Those cases both establish that there
is no need for the judge to “specifically inquire” about the factual bases of every element
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of the charge where “the relevant circumstances surrounding the plea as contained in the
record” show the plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Hawkins, 117 Idaho at 28890, 787 P.2d at 274-76.
However, neither of these nuanced decisions suggest an inflexible rule running the
opposite direction: that a trial court must accept a guilty plea—despite harboring doubts
about the factual basis of the crime—or risk abusing its discretion. It beggars belief that
this is an appropriate standard, not just because it would dilute the trial court’s “wide
discretion” to reject a plea into meaninglessness. Schoger, 148 Idaho at 627, 226 P.3d at
1274. Such a standard would effectively bar trial courts from accepting guilty pleas even
if they doubt there is a factual basis for the plea.
But that is not the standard. Trial courts do not abuse their discretion by not
accepting a guilty plea when they doubt the factual basis of the plea. Id. at 629, 226 P.3d
at 1276. Courts have wide discretion to reject a guilty plea, and the trial court here did
not abuse its discretion by rejecting the plea for that reason.
Finally, while not addressed in Pagan-Lopez’s briefing, the state notes that it
considers this issue dispositive of all of Pagan-Lopez’s claims on appeal. If this Court
grants relief on this claim and remands this case for an entry of guilty plea pursuant to the
parties’ original plea agreement, it would obviously dispose of Pagan-Lopez’s claim of
trial error. It would also resolve the claimed double jeopardy violation, as the state
agreed to dismiss the major contraband charge as part of the plea agreement. (Tr. vol. I,
p.27, Ls.5-16.) Pagan-Lopez’s Fourth Amendment claim would likewise be moot, as
Pagan-Lopez agreed not to challenge the district court’s ruling on the motion to suppress
as part of the plea. (Tr. vol. I, p.26, L.24 – p.27, L.3.) Finally, while Pagan-Lopez agreed
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to pay restitution as part of the agreement, the exact amount was left open; this issue
could therefore be sorted out at a restitution hearing following the re-entry of plea and
redone sentencing. (See Tr. vol. I, p.28, Ls.11-28.)
If this Court grants relief on this claim it would resolve the rest of Pagan-Lopez’s
claimed issues on appeal; accordingly, the state respectfully requests this Court address
this potentially dispositive issue first.

II.
Pagan-Lopez Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion To
Suppress Evidence
A.

Introduction
Pagan-Lopez claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss

because 1) the officers did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, and 2) the
discovery of Pagan-Lopez’s arrest warrant “did not break the causal chain between the
unlawful stop and the discovery of evidence on his person at the jail.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp.11-18.)
These arguments fail.

There was ample reasonable suspicion that supported

stopping Pagan-Lopez’s vehicle in the course of investigating a potential residential
burglary. Alternatively, even if the stop was unlawful, the discovery of the arrest warrant
and circumstances surrounding the stop weigh in favor of applying the attenuation
doctrine and not excluding the evidence that was ultimately found.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers to the

trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of the trial
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court’s determination as to whether constitutional standards have been satisfied in light of
the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State
v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309 (2004). If findings are supported by
substantial evidence in the record, those “[f]indings will not be deemed clearly
erroneous.” State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)).

C.

The Officers Had Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Pagan-Lopez’s Vehicle In
Connection With The Investigation Of A Potential Residential Burglary
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution “[t]he right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Such
a detention “is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify
suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity.” State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417
(1981)).
The state has the burden of proving that the investigatory stop of a vehicle was
constitutionally justified. State v. Nevarez, 147 Idaho 470, 474, 210 P.3d 578, 582 (Ct.
App. 2009) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). “The reasonableness of a
stop is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer
at the time of the stop.” Nevarez, 147 Idaho at 474, 210 P.3d at 582 (citing Cortez, 449
U.S. at 417); see also State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992).
Likewise, “[d]ue weight must be given to the reasonable inferences that a law

13

enforcement officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”
Nevarez, 147 Idaho at 474, 210 P.3d at 582 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
For example, in Nevarez, dispatch informed the responding officer “that an armed
robbery had just occurred at a store in Rupert.” Id. According to the report, “two
Hispanic individuals wearing hooded sweatshirts, stocking caps and bandanas”
committed the robbery. Id. While the officer did not have a vehicle description, or even
information that the robbers were traveling by vehicle, he responded to the robbery site
and encountered a suspicious vehicle:
Here, the officer saw the car approaching from the direction of the robbed
convenience store at about the time that it would have taken to drive from
the robbery. The car was traveling well below the speed limit, which
suggested to the officer from his experience that the driver could be
attempting to avoid police contact. The occupants seemed to exhibit
unusual interest in or concern about the patrol car as they went by. As
Deputy Moore followed close behind the car, he saw activity suggesting
that the occupants might be changing clothing or hiding items, and the
driver appeared to be continuing to drive with excessive caution. The
vehicle occupants, like the robbers, appeared to be Hispanic.
Id. at 474–76, 210 P.3d at 582–84.
The Nevarez Court concluded that “[t]he possibility of innocent explanations for
the behavior of the driver and vehicle occupants does not preclude reasonable suspicion
that they were involved in the robbery.” Id. at 476, 210 P.3d at 584. The officer’s
observations, taken together, “were sufficient to create reasonable suspicion warranting a
brief stop of the vehicle to investigate whether the occupants had committed the robbery.”
Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court has similarly upheld the seizure of an individual
walking away from the location of a reported burglary. State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930,
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932–33, 829 P.2d 520, 522–23 (1992). In Rawlings, officers responded to a reported
early-morning burglary of a store; upon arriving they “discovered a window had been
broken in order to gain entry to the building.” Id. at 931, 829 P.2d at 521. Officers
noticed a “man walking across a parking lot in the block immediately to the west of the
site of the reported burglary.” Id. Furthermore, “[n]o other persons were visible in the
area at that time.” Id. The officer ran after the individual, who “continued walking
northerly and disappeared along the west side of the funeral home which blocked the
officer’s view.” Id. The officer eventually “found the individual stopped in the parking
lot” and detained him. Id.
Much like the Nevarez Court, the Rawlings Court acknowledged the possibility of
innocent explanations for the suspicious facts, but nevertheless found the officers had
reasonable suspicion justifying the stop:
The defendant was the only person in the area other than the police
officers. The defendant was walking away from the locale of the reported
burglary. The defendant departed from a walkway and proceeded to cross
the parking lot, which course of travel would take him out of the vision of
the police officers. There was a motel in the direction in which the
defendant was traveling. It is possible that the defendant could have been
on an innocent mission, but these facts, together with the reported crime,
provided objectively reasonable grounds which were adequate to support a
police officer’s suspicion of criminal activity. These facts, in their totality,
provide a basis for the trial court’s conclusion that the police officer’s stop
of the defendant was a valid detention of a person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal activity, although there was no probable
cause to make an arrest.
Id. at 933, 829 P.2d at 523.
Most recently, Idaho Court of Appeals examined a similar fact pattern in State v.
Robertson, 134 Idaho 180, 183, 997 P.2d 641, 644 (2000), where officers responded to a
report of a burglary alarm at a business. An officer there knew the business “had been
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burglarized and vandalized on several previous occasions.” Id. at 183, 997 P.2d at 644.
By the time law enforcement arrived the alarm was no longer sounding, but “the officer
noticed Robertson walking in a direction away from the business.” Id. Robertson was
“approximately 100 to 125 feet from the business in question,” and was the only person
in the area, so he was detained. Id. The Robertson Court similarly found the detention
was justified, possible innocent explanations notwithstanding:
In the instant case, the district court found that the officer responded at
night to a reported burglar alarm, that the officer was aware that the
reported building had been burglarized and vandalized in the recent past,
and that Robertson was the only person at the scene of the reported alarm
other than the officer. This Court will not substitute its view for that of the
trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to
the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. Although Robertson could have been innocently walking his dog
as he claims on appeal, the facts as found by the district court provide
objectively reasonable grounds to support the officer’s suspicion of
criminal activity. Robertson has failed to show that those findings are
clearly erroneous. Consequently, we conclude that the district court’s
determination that the officer was justified in stopping Robertson will not
be disturbed on appeal.
Id. at 185, 997 P.2d at 646 (internal citations omitted).
This case presents strikingly similar, equally suspicious facts. (Tr. vol. I, p.12,
L.12 – p.18, L.23.) The trial court found that the officers “were dispatched to a silent
residential alarm on a laundry room door at 2294 South Longmont Drive, which sits at
the very end of a dead-end street.” (Tr. vol. I, p.12, Ls.17-20.) The officers “saw a white
van at the stop sign preparing to exit the street,” and moreover, “[i]t was the only
operating vehicle on the street.” (Tr. vol. I, p.12, Ls.23-25.) The officers also “observed
that there wasn’t much traffic at all, and hadn’t seen very many other vehicles,” and so
they “decided to perform a stop on the vehicle for suspicion of burglary.” (Tr. vol. I,
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p.12, L.25 – p.13, L.3.) The court also noted that “the officer explicitly stated in his
testimony that he stopped the vehicle to investigate for suspicion of burglary.” (Tr. vol. I,
p.16, Ls.13-15.)
The trial court therefore correctly concluded that this investigatory stop, like those
in Rawlings and Robertson, was proper. (Tr. vol. I, p.14, L.22 – p.18, L.23.) Noting the
alarm, the dead-end street, the time of day and corresponding lack of traffic, and fact that
the defendant was driving “the only vehicle exiting that dead-end street in the early
morning hours,” the trial court found the totality of the suspicious facts justified the stop:
I do find that these facts compare to the cases in which Idaho courts have
found that law-enforcement officers had a reasonable [sic] an objective
reasonable standard for an investigatory stop to determine whether that
van was connected in any way to the alarm and the potential burglary
because under the totality of the circumstances there was sufficient
evidence to support a supporting [sic] of reasonable suspicion for the
reasonable stop. The investigatory stop itself was lawful.
(Tr. vol. I, p.17, L.23 – p.18, L.7.)
On appeal, Pagan-Lopez fails to show this conclusion was erroneous. He makes
much ado about the volume of the burglar alarm in this case, downplaying it as “a silent
alarm for a residence, not an audible security alarm for a closed business or a report of a
burglary.” (Appellant’s brief, p.14.) Pagan-Lopez suggests that “[a] business security
alarm of burglary report weighs in favor of criminal activity, but there are many innocent
reasons why a residential alarm would go off in the early morning”—such as, he
contends, “a household member, an animal, a fallen item, an alarm malfunction, or an
unwanted intruder.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.12, 14.)
This argument fails. Euphemisms like “residential alarm” or a “silent alarm” are
doing much of the work here by omitting the salient point: it was a burglar alarm.
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(Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.12, Ls.17-19.) The officer referred to it as a “burglary alarm.”
(Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.13, Ls.5-10.) The purpose of a burglar alarm is not to alert law
enforcement that a household member is sleepwalking, or that a chandelier has fallen, or
that a cat is causing some mischief near the laundry-room door. A burglar alarm signifies
that there is a potential burglary occurring, which is exactly why people own such alarms,
and exactly why police respond to such alarms, and explicitly why the officer here was
dispatched to the scene. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.12, Ls.17-19; p.13, Ls.5-10.) Pagan-Lopez
fails to show that this alarm—”residential” and “silent” though it may have been—was
any less suspicious than a burglar alarm at a business, which he sensibly admits “weighs
in favor of criminal activity.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.14.) And any burglar alarm—

residential or business—could conceivably go off for any of the reasons Pagan-Lopez
conjures up; but the possibility that a burglar alarm could errantly activate does not mean
that the facts on the ground did not support the officer’s suspicions of criminal activity.
Pagan-Lopez was driving away from the location of a burglar alarm, early in the
morning, on a dead-end street, and was the only vehicle present when he was stopped by
the officer dispatched to investigate the alarm. The totality of these facts supports the
officer’s decision to stop the vehicle, and the trial court correctly concluded the same.

D.

Even If The Stop Was Unlawful, The Evidence Would Be Admissible Under The
Attenuation Doctrine
In the alternative, even if the stop was lawful, the evidence would be admissible

under the attenuation doctrine. The state agrees with Pagan-Lopez that while the district
court did not reach this issue because it found the stop was lawful (see Tr. vol. I, p.18,
Ls.6-25), the parties presented argument regarding attenuation. (Appellant’s brief, p.15;
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Tr. vol. I, p.4, L.10 – p.12, L.11). Should this Court conclude the stop was unlawful, this
issue would therefore be preserved for review on appeal. Cf. State v. Garcia-Rodriguez,
162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (“This Court will not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal.”).
Under the attenuation doctrine evidence may be admitted “when the connection
between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been
interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the
constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the
evidence obtained.’” Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (quoting Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)). To determine whether the attenuation doctrine
applies, courts look to three factors: “the elapsed time between the misconduct and the
acquisition of the evidence”; whether there were any intervening circumstances, such as
an arrest warrant; and whether the police misconduct “is purposeful or flagrant.” State v.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721-22, 404 P.3d 659, 663-64 (2017) (emphasis in original,
citing Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056).
In Cohagan, while the existence of an arrest warrant weighed “strongly in favor of
attenuation,” the court found there was no attenuation due to purposeful or flagrant police
misconduct. 162 Idaho at 721-726, 404 P.3d at 663-668. In that case there was “no
‘bona fide investigation’”—the officers had “no cause” to stop the defendant, not only
because they had already identified him, but “because both Officer Otto and Officer
Curtis himself had already confirmed that Cohagan was not the suspected individual.” Id.
at 723-24, 404 P.3d at 665-66. In other words, “there was simply no reason for Officer
Curtis to stop Cohagan and run a warrant check.” Id. at 724, 404 P.3d at 666. Because
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the attenuation doctrine does not allow “unjustified, suspicionless seizure of citizens,” the
attenuation doctrine was inapplicable in that case. Id. at 726, 404 P.3d 668.
Here, there was abundant suspicion and justification for the officer to stop PaganLopez: Pagan-Lopez was an unidentified individual and the prime suspect in an ongoing
investigation of a reported burglar alarm. He was the only person found at the area. (Tr.
vol. I, p.12, Ls.22-25.) It was early in the morning, and Pagan-Lopez was driving away
from the scene. (Tr. vol. I, p.12, Ls22-25.) Not only was there an ongoing bona fide
investigation, but the officer had ample justification to detain Pagan-Lopez “to see if it
was possibly related to that burglary alarm in any way.” (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.12, Ls.1719; p.13, Ls.5-10.) The officer eventually discovered that Pagan-Lopez “had an active
felony warrant for his arrest.” (Tr. vol. I, p.13, Ls.12-15.) Because this was nothing like
an unjustified, suspicionless search, and because the active warrants were an intervening
circumstance strongly favoring the state, the attenuation doctrine would apply here, and
exclusion would be improper regardless of the propriety of the detention.

III.
Pagan-Lopez Has Failed To Show His Double Jeopardy Rights Under The Idaho
Constitution Were Violated And Failed To Show Fundamental Error

A.

Introduction
Pagan-Lopez contends, for the first time on appeal, that his double jeopardy rights

under the Idaho Constitution were violated because, “[u]nder the pleading theory, the
charged offense of possession of a controlled substance was a lesser included offense of
introduction of major contraband.” (Appellant’s brief, p.29.) Pagan-Lopez failed to raise
this claim below, and fails to show that it constitutes fundamental error.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an

alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226,
245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Whether a defendant’s prosecution complies with the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. State v. Santana, 135
Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000). The interpretation and application of a
statute is also a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943,
946, 265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct. App. 2011).

C.

Pagan-Lopez Has Failed To Show That Possession Of A Controlled Substance Is
A Lesser Included Offense Of Introduction Or Attempted Introduction Of Major
Contraband
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Pagan-Lopez to

demonstrate the error he alleges:

“(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived

constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245
P.3d at 980.
Pagan-Lopez argues his unwaived constitutional right to be free from double
jeopardy was violated, contending that, under the facts of this case, possession of a
controlled substance “was a lesser included offense of introduction of major contraband.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 28-32.) “There are two theories under which a particular offense
may be determined to be a lesser included of a charged offense.” State v. Sanchez-
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Castro, 157 Idaho 647, 648, 339 P.3d 372, 373 (2014) (quoting State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho
522, 524, 944 P.2d 119, 121 (1997)). Those theories are referred to as the statutory
theory and the pleading theory. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 648, 339 P.3d at 373
(citations omitted).

Idaho appellate courts apply the Blockburger 3 test in analyzing

whether an offense is an included offense under the statutory theory. Id. (citing State v.
Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 261 P.3d 519, 521 (2011)). Under this test, an offense is
considered included in another offense “if all the elements required to sustain a
conviction of the lesser included offense are included within the elements needed to
sustain a conviction of the greater offense.” Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527, 261 P.3d at 521
(quoting State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114, 594 P.2d 149, 152 (1979)). However,
on appeal, Pagan-Lopez only raises a claim under the pleading theory. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 22-27.)
Idaho is among several jurisdictions which have utilized the “pleading theory” to
determine whether the conviction and punishment for two offenses violates the double
jeopardy clause of respective state constitutions. State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, 87,
383 P.3d 1249, 1257 (2016); see also State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 372-375, 256 P.3d

3

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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776, 780-84 (Ct. App. 2011). 4 Under the pleading theory, a court must consider whether
the terms of the charging document allege that both offenses arose from the same factual
circumstance such that one offense was the means by which the other was committed.
Corbus, 151 Idaho at 372-75, 256 P.3d at 780-84. Because the pleading theory relies on
an examination of the charging Information, it generally provides a broader definition of
greater and lesser included offenses than a statutory theory approach. Id. The pleading
theory holds “that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in the information [or
indictment] as a means or element of the commission of the higher offense.” SanchezCastro, 157 Idaho at 648, 339 P.3d at 373 (citing Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211, 731
P.2d 192, 206 (1986)).
Pagan-Lopez argues that his “possession of a controlled substance was the means
or manner by which he committed the offense of introduction of major contraband into a
correctional facility.” (Appellant’s brief, p.31.) He contends that “both offenses are
entirely based on the same factual predicate of law enforcement finding the baggie of
methamphetamine in Mr. Pagan-Lopez’s sock at the jail on December 2.” (Appellant’s
32.) Pagan-Lopez argues that because “his possession of the methamphetamine was
necessary for him to introduce it into the jail,” under the pleading theory, the “possession

4

In a post-Corbus case, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the Idaho Supreme
Court’s continued application of the “pleading theory” means that the “pleading theory”
is the only theory to be applied when addressing a double jeopardy claim under the Idaho
Constitution. State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 n.3, 330 P.3d 400, 404 n.3 (Ct. App.
2014); see also Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 648-649, 339 P.3d at 373-374. This appears
to have been affirmed by Sepulveda, where the Idaho Supreme Court only applied the
pleading theory to the appellant’s double jeopardy claim under the Idaho Constitution.
161 Idaho at 87-89, 383 P.3d at 1257-59. The state is unaware of the United States
Supreme Court ever applying the pleading theory.
23

of a controlled substance was a lesser included offense of introduction of major
contraband.” (Appellant’s brief, p.32.)
But under Idaho’s pleading theory, whether one crime is a lesser included offense
of another crime can be determined from the face of the record simply by reading the
information charging each crime. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 88, 383 P.3d at 1258; State v.
McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841, 291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013). And the face of the record
does not show that, as pled, possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included
offense of introduction or attempted introduction. The information, as amended, states:
COUNT I
That the defendant, CARLOS ENRIQUE PAGAN-LOPEZ, on or about
the 2nd day of December, 2016, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did
unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a
Schedule II controlled substance.
COUNT II
That the defendant, CARLOS ENRIQUE PAGAN-LOPEZ, on or about
the 2nd day of December, 2016, did knowingly and unlawfully introduce
and/or attempt to introduce major contraband to-wit: Methamphetamine, a
Schedule II controlled substance into a correctional facility or the grounds
of a correctional facility without permission of the facility head.
(R., p.32.)
From the face of the information, not all the elements of possession of a
controlled substance are pled in the introduction and/or attempted introduction of major
contraband charge; namely, the latter does not contain a possession element, while the
former does. (R., p.32.) “Possession” and “introduction” are not synonyms; one can
possess something without introducing (or attempting to introduce) it, and vice versa. By
charging Pagan-Lopez with introducing and/or attempting to introduce major contraband
under 18-2510(a)—as opposed to charging him with possession of major contraband,
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which the state could have done under 18-2510(c)—the face of the information omitted
the possession element. (See R., p.32.) Accordingly, the possession charge was not pled
“as a means or element of the commission of the higher offense.” See Sanchez-Castro,
157 Idaho at 648, 339 P.3d at 373.
This was exactly what occurred in Sepulveda, where the Idaho Supreme Court,
applying the pleading theory, found that “[f]rom the face of the information, not all the
elements of intimidating a witness are pled in the counts charging the attempted
violations of the no contact order.” 161 Idaho at 88, 383 P.3d at 1258. There, neither of
the NCO-violation counts made “reference to whether L.M. was a witness or whether
Sepulveda ‘did ... or did attempt to intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or
prevent [L.M.] ... from testifying.’”

Id.

The Court thus concluded that “felony

intimidating a witness was not pled as a means or element of the commission of either of
the attempted violations of a no contact order.” Id. Similarly, Count II here makes no
reference to Pagan-Lopez possessing the methamphetamine; it simply charges him with
introducing or attempting to introduce that methamphetamine into a correctional facility.
From the face of the information, not all elements of the possession charge were pled in
Count II, and so under the pleading theory there was no double jeopardy violation.
Moreover, the structure of the statute affirms that “possession” and “introduction”
are separate acts, intended to be charged separately. The Idaho Legislature designed I.C.
§ 18-2510 so that a defendant could be charged with either possessing contraband in a
correctional facility, or attempting to introduce contraband into a correctional facility,
among other things:
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18-2510.
POSSESSION, INTRODUCTION OR REMOVAL OF
CERTAIN ARTICLES INTO OR FROM CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES.
(1) No person including a prisoner, except as authorized by law or with
permission of the facility head, shall knowingly:
(a) Introduce, or attempt to introduce, contraband into a
correctional facility or the grounds of a correctional facility; or
(b) Convey, or attempt to convey, contraband to a prisoner
confined in a correctional facility; or
(c)
Possess, or attempt to possess, contraband within a
correctional facility; or
(d) Receive, obtain or remove, or attempt to receive, obtain or
remove, contraband from a correctional facility.
I.C. § 18-2510 (emphasis added). The Legislature intended for possession and
introduction to be punishable as two separate acts, and reductively reading them as
synonyms here would thwart that purpose. 5
From the face of the information, possession of a controlled substance is not the
means or element by which Pagan-Lopez committed introduction and/or attempted
introduction of major contraband. Because Pagan-Lopez cannot show that there was any
violation of an unwaived constitutional right, he has failed to show fundamental error.

5

The state concedes that it likely would violate double jeopardy for the state to charge
possession of a controlled substance along with 18-2510(c)—i.e., along with possession
of major contraband in a correctional facility. Depending on the charging language in that
hypothetical case, the face of the information would likely contain the possession charge
as a lesser included charge. But because that was not how this was charged, from the face
of the information, Pagan-Lopez fails to show a double jeopardy violation.
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IV.
The Exclusion of Pagan-Lopez’s Testimony About His Own Mental Health Was
Harmless Error
A.

Introduction
Pagan-Lopez claims the district court abused its discretion when it excluded his

“layperson testimony” about his mental condition. (Appellant’s brief, pp.33-37.) PaganLopez contends that the district court erroneously interpreted I.C. § 18-207(1) to require
Pagan-Lopez to notify the state prior to presenting such evidence, and erred by excluding
the evidence on that basis. (Appellant’s brief, p.36.) Pagan-Lopez further claims that
“the State cannot prove that this error was harmless.” (Appellant’s brief, p.37.)
This argument fails.

While the court did err by excluding Pagan-Lopez’s

testimony based on I.C. 18-207(1), Pagan-Lopez ultimately went on to testify about his
memory of the events at issue. The error was therefore harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court “applies an abuse of discretion standard” when reviewing the trial

court’s evidentiary rulings. State v. Anderson, 162 Idaho 610, 615, 402 P.3d 1063, 1068
(2017) (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163-64, 45 P.3d
816, 819-20 (2002)). “To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this
Court considers whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards,
and whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (citing Perry v. Magic
Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000).
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C.

While Error, The Exclusion Of Pagan-Lopez’s Testimony Regarding His Faulty
Memory Was Harmless, Insofar As It Was Irrelevant To Count I, And Because
Pagan-Lopez Went On To Testify About His Memory Regarding The Events In
Question
Pagan-Lopez testified at trial. (Tr. vol. I, pp.204-18.) Prior to doing so, his

attorney notified the court that “[o]n direct, I am going to ask my client about his memory
problems and his epilepsy.” (Tr. vol. I, p.198, Ls.20-23.) The state objected, claiming
that pursuant to I.C. § 18-207 Pagan-Lopez had not provided sufficient notice for
testimony about “a medical or physical condition or psychological condition to somehow
explain away a mens rea element.” (Tr. vol. I, p.198, L.20 – p.199, L.22.) The district
court agreed, concluding that the notice provisions in I.C. § 18-207 applied “not only [to]
expert testimony”:
THE COURT: 18-207 addresses, not only expert testimony, and, (4),
presents it through evidence of an expert witness or permit such evidence
to be placed before a jury, so it’s not just limited to an expert. It’s also
limited to the defendant’s own opinion of his medical condition, so I do
believe the rule prohibits it without proper notice.
(Tr. vol. I, p.201, Ls.14-20.)
This was an error. I.C. § 18-207 provides in relevant part that:
(4) No court shall, over the objection of any party, receive the evidence of
any expert witness on any issue of mental condition, or permit such
evidence to be placed before a jury, unless such evidence is fully subject to
the adversarial process in at least the following particulars:
(a) Notice must be given at least ninety (90) days in advance of trial, or
such other period as justice may require, that a party intends to raise
any issue of mental condition and to call expert witnesses concerning
such issue, failing which such witness shall not be permitted to testify
until such time as the opposing party has a complete opportunity to
consider the substance of such testimony and prepare for rebuttal
through such opposing expert(s) as the party may choose.
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I.C. § 18-207(4) (emphasis added). By its plain terms, the “such evidence” that the notice
provisions apply to is a reference to expert evidence on any issue of mental condition.
See id.
But the error of “excluding” this evidence—evidence of purported epilepsy and
“memory problems”—was harmless. As to Count I, the state did not have to prove any
particular mental state to convict Pagan-Lopez of unlawful possession. See I.C. § 372732(c). Evidence affecting Pagan-Lopez’s mental state, such as evidence of memory
loss, was therefore irrelevant to Count I, and any exclusion of that evidence was harmless
as to the conviction on Count I.
As to Count II, Pagan-Lopez failed to show how evidence of an epileptic
condition would have any bearing on his memory or knowledge of committing the crime.
(See (Tr. vol. I, p.201, Ls.5-13.) Regarding the memory problems, which could have
potentially been relevant, Pagan-Lopez made this quasi-offer of proof:
Your Honor, I would just say that I wasn’t intending to have him [testify]
that he isn’t capable of knowingly possessing anything given his mental
condition, and what I would ask him to testify about, it would simply be to
explain short-term memory loss. Given the court’s ruling, am I still
allowed to inquire as to my client’s opinion as to his own memory without
going into the causation of how he views his own memory?
(Tr. vol. I, p.201, Ls.5-13.)
However, the record does not indicate that Pagan-Lopez was properly qualified to
“explain short-term memory loss” as a matter of professional expertise. At best, PaganLopez would have only been able to testify about the effects of his own memory loss on
the events at issue, which is exactly what he did:
Q. After that, were you still looking for cans when Officer Feldner made
contact with you?
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A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember Officer Feldner asking you to get out of the vehicle?
A. Yes.
Q. And prior to that, you never told Officer Feldner about the baggie in
your sock?
A. No; at that moment, that didn’t even exist to me. I forgot about it.
Q. Were you confused when he asked you to get out of the vehicle?
A. A little bit.
Q. After he explained himself, did you get out of the vehicle?
A. Yes; I did.
Q. And did he pat-search you?
A. Yeah.
Q. And did he find the needle—the syringe?
A. I think so.
Q. And did you tell him anything about the syringe?
A. I think that I told him where I found it that it was in a hygiene bag that I
just found.
Q. And then you were transported to the jail by Officer Ellis; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. You never told her?
A. At that moment that didn’t exist to me.
Q. Did she ever ask you?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Then you were taken to the jail in booking; do you remember that?
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A. Yes.
Q. When is it that you remembered that you had the bag?
A. When I took my sock off and it was there.
Q. Had you remembered that it was there at any prior time?
A. No.
Q. What did you do when you saw the bag?
A. I almost cry.
(Tr. vol. I, p. 211, L.1 – p.212, L.16 (emphasis added).)
Pagan-Lopez was therefore able to testify, without objection, as to the only mental
state relevant to the charge: he could not remember picking up the methamphetamine.
(See id.) As a result, any error in excluding his opinion testimony was harmless as to
Count II.
V.
Pagan-Lopez Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Ordering
Restitution For Costs Of Prosecution
A.

Introduction
Pagan-Lopez claims the district court abused its discretion when it ordered

restitution for the state’s costs of prosecution. (Appellant’s brief, pp.37-42.) He claims
the district court “abused its discretion because the State failed to show with substantial
and competent evidence the costs actually incurred for prosecution.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp.37-38.)
This argument fails. The district court correctly awarded restitution pursuant to
Idaho Code § 37-2732(k), as the award was supported by sworn evidence delineating the
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attorneys that worked on the case and evidence, based upon payroll records, of the actual
prosecution costs to the county.

B.

Standard Of Review
What amount of restitution to award is a question of fact for the district court,

“whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.” State v.
Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 700, 390 P.3d 424, 426 (2017).

C.

The District Court’s Restitution Award Was Supported By Substantial Evidence
The state is permitted by I.C. § 37-2732(k) to “recoup its prosecution costs as

restitution.”

Id.

That statute provides that “[u]pon conviction of a felony or

misdemeanor violation under this chapter or upon conviction of a felony pursuant to the
“racketeering act,” section 18-7804, Idaho Code, or the money laundering and illegal
investment provisions of section 18-8201, Idaho Code, the court may order restitution for
costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation.” I.C. § 372732(k).

An award of “restitution under section 37-2732(k) must be based on a

preponderance of the evidence.” Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 701, 390 P.3d at 427.
In Cunningham, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an “unsworn Statement of
Costs does not meet” that evidentiary burden, because “unsworn representations, even by
an officer of the court, do not constitute ‘substantial evidence’ upon which restitution
under section 37-2732(k) may be based.” Id. at 702, 390 P.3d at 428. The Court further
clarified that the statute does “not permit recovery of what is ‘reasonable,’” and only
permits prosecution expenses that are actually incurred. Id. Lastly, the Court cautioned
that “[a]t a minimum, measuring up to section 37-2732(k)’s burden to prove expenses
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actually incurred will generally require sworn statements that delineate the time spent
performing specific tasks.” Id.
The sworn statement in support of restitution here capably meets that burden. The
statement was made by Kylie Bolland, an Ada County employee with “access to payroll
records maintained by Ada County in the regular course of its business.” (R., p.116.)
Ms. Bolland swore that the county maintained records “regarding the attorney time spent
prosecuting drug cases,” and that she “reviewed the time log in this case, which
documents the prosecutor time spent prosecuting” this case. (R., p.116.) Ms. Bolland
listed the deputy prosecutors who worked on the case, and “applied the appropriate
payroll rate for said attorneys” to calculate “the aggregate actual prosecution costs” to
arrive at a total of $996.27. (R., pp.116-17.)
In sum, the state presented the sworn statement of a county employee who reviewed the
payroll records, including the actual time each attorney spent on the case, to calculate the
actual prosecution costs to prosecute this case. This is exactly what is required by
Cunningham and the plain language of Idaho Code § 37-2732(k). The district court had
substantial and competent evidence to support its restitution determination.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Pagan-Lopez’s judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 15th day of May, 2018.
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